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REVIEWS AND NEW BOOKS

General Works, Theory and Its History

Social Process. By CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. 430. \$2.00.)

Readers of Professor Cooley's earlier books, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Organization*—especially those who have used either as a text in sociology—must await with interest any further work put out by him. They will not be disappointed in the present work which is a continuation and amplification of the point of view and philosophy of the preceding books, especially *Social Organization*.

The present work is divided into seven parts dealing respectively with the organic view of the process of human life, personal aspects of social processes, degeneration, social factors in biological survival, group conflict, valuation, and intelligent processes. The main interest of the economist in this work will naturally attach to Professor Cooley's treatment of valuation and to his continued pointed attack upon the economic interpretation of history. To these points this review will give its major attention.

It would be unjust, however, to the author to omit any criticism of the more strictly sociological portion of the work. To the writer, Cooley's work has always been distinctly stimulating and suggestive and his *Social Organization* has been found to be perhaps the most distinctly stimulating book as yet available for classes in sociology. But it has always been difficult to decide, however, whether his work is sociology or ethics, and it is just at this point that "hard-boiled" critics might assail him; for this book, like the entire theoretical part of *Social Organization* is shot through and through with an idealism which some methodologists would hold incompatible with a scientific treatment. Those who hold this view will insist upon the necessity of a strict separation of the "is" from the "ought," and will maintain that in sociology, as well as in economics, no scientific headway can be made as long as ethical considerations are not coldly kept to one side. The reviewer is unable to accept this view, although there are doubtless grave dangers in the method followed by Professor Cooley and many "social economists." These dangers Professor Cooley has, in the main, avoided, although he at times approaches suggestively near to homiletics.

His treatment of social relations and processes is scientifically as

well as analytically and practically functional. The fact that he devotes over one hundred pages to degeneration, biological survival, and group conflict shows that he does not neglect the conflict aspect of organization; but his real, positive contribution lies in the place he gives to organization, coöperation, democracy (regarded primarily as opportunity), and to independent purposeful control for collective ends. Organization and coöperation he regards as fundamental processes. Now while idealism must relate mainly to purpose and function—to the ethical rather than the scientific—the idealist, if he be at the same time a man of broad scientific training, is often in position to sense important facts and relations and to draw more subtle, but not less powerful, generalizations than the hard-boiled mind is able to compass. Professor Cooley's idealism is of this type. It is in the main an aid rather than an obstacle to his objective, scientific insight.

Part I, dealing with the organic view, is in substance a repetition of the matter contained in *Social Organization*. In chapter 4 he passes to the relation between organization and conflict. This is one of the least satisfactory chapters in the whole book. He might have worked out an instructive chapter on the conflicts and interactions of the various institutions and interests—economic, religious, moral, esthetic, etc.,—which constitute the organic social process. But instead he gives us a series of topics on conflict and coöperation each touched but superficially, interlaced with near-homiletic observations, and rounded out in chapter 5 with a somewhat querulous though pointed attack upon the narrowness of economic particularism. Later in the book he comes back to this attack upon the classical traditions and methods in economics.

Part II on the personal aspect of social process contains matter of much interest, especially a discussion of opportunity in relation to culture and class. One can only regret that he does not give a less superficial discussion of the elimination of organized misery (pp. 85-86). In chapter 12, on the competitive spirit, is matter which may be recommended to the attention of those who think that the pecuniary motive is the only dependable motive of economic and public service. The content of his chapter on the higher emulation—an emphasis on support by group spirit, sense of security, and self-expression—is of the highest importance.

In part V he comes back to conflict in relation to organization. His main line of thought seems to be that there is and must be a

gradual softening of the outlines of conflict and overlapping of groups and a growth of democracy. There is perhaps an optimistic overemphasis upon this softening of conflict, and an overlooking especially of the sharpness of the labor-capital conflict as it expresses itself at the present. Yet he does not take it for granted that democracies will necessarily be any less pugnacious or more capable of rational integration than other forms of organization.

To the economist the central interest of the book will lie in part VI, on valuation. Here Professor Cooley's fundamental thought is that all values, whether ethical, esthetic, or what not, are reducible, at least distantly, to pecuniary expression. In pursuit of this thought he distinguishes between what he calls human and institutional values, the first being "those which may be traced without difficulty to phases of human nature," the second "those which must be ascribed to some institution of some sort." This distinction leads to a long treatment of the institutional character of pecuniary valuation. Perhaps the chief critical question which will arise in this connection is, How does such a distinction between human and institutional values comport with Professor Cooley's organic view of the individual? Are there any valuations of consequence to which he can point as distinctly human and uninfluenced by institutional relations? Moreover, are we ready to say what are pure human values until the psychologists come more nearly into agreement on the original nature of man? Professor Cooley himself says (p. 302): "It seems probable that the more we consider, in the light of an organic view of society, the practice of discussing values apart from their institutional antecedents, the more sterile, except for somewhat narrowly technical purposes, this practice will appear." With this statement we heartily agree. Its significance for the student of economic values is found in the further assertion (p. 338) that "the progress of market valuation, as a rule, is a translation into pecuniary terms of values which have already become, in some measure, a social institution." Thus Professor Cooley joins the ranks of the recalcitrant economists, headed by Veblen, in their refusal to accept mere demand as a final datum line. Professor Cooley, perhaps, does not add to the familiar treatments of this subject by Veblen, Anderson, and others. What it all amounts to is a plea for historical and critical study of consumption standards and motives, which are obviously formed and influenced by a great variety of institutions, fashions, customs, and class included. In chapter 28, in which he discusses the pecuniary

sphere of valuation, the author seems momentarily the victim of a reversion to the economic interpretation of things, which is curious on the part of one who has fought economic determinism as hard as he has. "The distinctive function of money values," he says, "is to generalize or simulate values through a common measure." This is as much as the most unregenerate addict to economic determinism could claim.

But Professor Cooley quickly passes to the limitations to the pecuniary sphere, and here he comes back to the ethical aspect of his organic concept. "It would be fatuous," he says—and we agree with him—"to assume that the market process expresses the *good of society*." Further, even assuming that the demand does represent the good of society, the pecuniary motive cannot be trusted to stimulate production to efficiency. "The pecuniary motive can serve as an effective guide only in the case of deliberate production, for the sake of gain, and with ownership in the product" (p. 317). Present-day industrial psychology and the failure of older types of scientific management show that; but Cooley's objection lies in another direction. "The limitations on this motive shut out," he says, "the whole matter of production and development of men, of human and social life." The pecuniary process can never be trusted to control social life even on the economic side. And again, "Personal and social development must, in general, be sought through rational organization having a far wider scope than the market . . . and including, perhaps, radical reforms in the pecuniary system itself. It would be hard to formulate a principle more fallacious and harmful than the doctrine that the latter is an adequate regulator of human life, or that its own processes are superior to regulation" (p. 18). We are at a loss in this connection to know whether Professor Cooley is aiming his dart at specific theorists, or whether he is merely knocking down straw men.

In chapter 28 on the progress of pecuniary valuation, having already observed that notwithstanding the insufficiencies of pecuniary valuation the character of modern life seems to call for extension of its scope, he takes up the question as to why pecuniary values whose functions are so essential, and should be so beneficent, "appears in practice to ignore or deprecate many kinds of value, and these often the highest, by withholding pecuniary recognition; and, on the other hand, to create or exaggerate values which seem to have little or no human merit to justify such appraisal" (p. 333). The answer lies in brief in the breakdown of institutional

conventions which intervene between psychological values and their pecuniary expressions. The discussions which follow constitute probably what is the keenest part of the whole work.

In closing, a word may be said with regard to Professor Cooley's style. He may be regarded as a sort of modern sociological prototype of Emerson. His smooth-flowing sentences and his excessively mild manner make difficult reading. After a few chapters one becomes cloyed; but lay the book away and come back to it in a few days, and it is as fresh and stimulating as ever. Professor Cooley has the velvet paw—concealed within which the sharp claw is barely visible. One wishes occasionally that the prehensile power, which doubtless lies behind the claw, were not so uniformly repressed.

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NEW BOOKS

BARNARD, W. G. *The equitable division of the production.* (Seattle, Wash.: Author. 1920. Pp. 31.)

CHIMENTI, F. *L'attribuzione del prodotto industriale ai suoi fattori.* (Torino: Bocca. 1920. l. 18.)

CLARKE, J. J. and PRATT, J. E. *Outlines of industrial and social economics.* (London: Pitman. 1920. Pp. 112.)

CLOW, F. R. *Principles of sociology with educational applications.* (New York: Macmillan. 1920. Pp. xiv, 436.)

COLE, G. D. H. *Social theory.* (New York: Stokes. 1920. Pp. 220.)

DOUGLAS, C. H. *Economic democracy.* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe. 1920. Pp. 144.)

The evil of the existing system of production economics is the "constant filching of purchasing power from the individual in favor of the financier, rather than in the mere profit itself." The problem to be solved is the establishment of a stable ratio between the use value of effort and its money value. Prices should be fixed on the broad principles of use value.

EDIE, L. D., editor. *Current social and industrial forces.* (New York: Boni & Liveright. 1920. Pp. 292. \$2.50.)

A collection of more than one hundred extracts of articles on Forces of distribution; Potentialities of production; Price system; The direction of industry; Funds of reorganization (surplus product, social minimum, national credit and taxation, labor and the new social order); Power and policy of organized labor; Proposed plans of action; Industrial doctrines in defense of the status quo; Possibilities of social service. Extracts are largely from the writings of critics of the present economic system.